SCC MEETING OF 9 JUNE 1980 - "SECURITY FRAMEWORK"

Created: 6/10/1980

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

THE DIRECTOR Of CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WAlNINOtON. 0 C

O"-

00

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM

SUBJECT

Director for National Foreign Assessment

National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SCC MeetingSecurity Framework"

Action Requested: None; the following is for your informati

Background: The meeting was almost entirely confined to the Scnali issue. The State Department hasRC on Somalia for Monday, Until that time the present policy of seeking access will remain unchanged; State emphasized thatid not suggest we go back on the current access negotiations. In answer tb the Chairman1 question, do we really need the base at Berbera, the JCS rep pointed out that, given its geographic location, there are many advantages toort facility and an airfield there. ase at Berbera was not critical to our Indian Ocean action,evertheless was essential in view of the policy of base redundancy in the area. It was pointed out that we were not primarily attempting to deny Berbera to the Soviets, jatner,ase access thereositive contribution to American strategic interests in the western Indian Ocean. mWk

3. The Chairman suggested that we were faced with three possibilities: i 0ut ^and increased hostilities do not take

ar wre t0nd the Ethiopians were to take Berbera, this would be seen in the International community as another demonstration of American unreliability whether we had an agreement or not; andf war breaks out an American presence at Berbera is likely toignal to the Soviets even in the absence of an agreement.

4. The consensus was that we concentrate onatisfactory agreement but that we must be prepared toufficiently strong deterrent, either with American forces only or in cooperation with the

Egyptians, to discourage large scale Ethiopian hostilities. He hadwarned the Ethiopians not to cross the borderime when the Soviets were in Somalia. Surely we are not less committed to this warning now. An Ethiopian/Cuban takeover of Berbera wouldolitical setback for us; the strategic and political cost to usuccessful Ethiopian campaign would be as high whether we had an agreement with Siad or not.

5. It was agreed that the ErUrean situation and Ethiopian relations with the Sudan would be placed on the forthcoming PRC discussion agenda. Mr. Komer will draw up proposals for circulation on possible Egyptian assistance, after consultation with suitable Egyptian sources. Includedhese proposals would be talking points on the role of the Sudan. These proposals were not necessarily required for circulation before the PRC. "

Original document.

---

---